‘China shock 3.0’ is coming, and it will not look like cheap T-shirts

Alicia Garcia-Herrero has a phrase for what comes next, and she used it this week from Taipei after a Peterson Institute panel: “We are already at the starting point of the China shock 3.0.” The Bruegel senior fellow and Natixis chief Asia-Pacific economist argues the next wave of Chinese exports will be AI hardware and software, biotechnology and robots, and that it could hit harder than either of the two before it.
The numbering matters. China shock 1.0 is the one economists David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson documented: the surge of imports after China joined the WTO in 2001 and the American factory towns it hollowed out. Shock 2.0 began around 2018 and centred on advanced manufacturing, above all cars and machinery. Each wave moved up the value chain. Garcia-Herrero’s argument is that the third moves out of goods altogether. China, she says, will export its AI products once domestic demand is met, probably bundled with data-centre and cloud services, and its cheap energy will give it the lowest computing costs in the world. “If you think about embodied AI, humanoid robots or industrial robots, think about the humongous shock,” she said.
The numbers behind the argument are not speculative. China’s trade surplus reached $938 billion in the first nine months of the year, on track to beat last year’s record of $1.19 trillion. September exports rose 36.3 percent year on year, and the monthly surpluses with the United States and the European Union each topped $34 billion. Monday’s GDP data showed where that is coming from: industrial robot output up 29 percent, high-tech manufacturing up 14 percent, while investment and consumption at home shrink or stall.
The West’s response so far is a coalition. On October 7 in Paris, the United States and 14 other economies, including the EU, signed a pledge to act on “structural excess capacity” in EVs, batteries, chemicals, chips and solar. China did not sign. Beijing’s position, set out in a July commerce-ministry paper, is that its exports come from innovation, not subsidies, and that “there is no necessary connection between industrial subsidies and overcapacity.”
Here is where the analysis gets uncomfortable for everyone. Nicolas Lamp of Queen’s University argued on the same panel that the West should invite Chinese investment rather than treat all trade as a threat. Garcia-Herrero was unmoved: Chinese car plants in Europe would be assembly lines fed by imported parts, and Beijing’s security rules limit how much technology leaves with them. She called China “impressively careful with its tech transfer,” adding, “rightly so.” Yeling Tan of Oxford put the remaining room for compromise bluntly: “It’s a narrow corridor. But I wouldn’t say it doesn’t exist.”
The view from this side of the prism is simpler. Overcapacity coalitions were built to deal with products that arrive on ships. The third shock arrives as a software update and a lease on compute. Nobody has yet explained what a tariff on that looks like.
